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INTRODUCTION 
 
Maurice Duverger was born in Angoulême, France, in 1917. He is undoubtedly 
the most influential French political scientist to date. Indeed, it would scarcely be 
an exaggeration to suggest that he is also perhaps the most well-known political 
scientist anywhere, given that all students of politics are bound to come across 
Duverger’s Law at some point or another in their professional studies. As we 
shall see, Duverger’s work profoundly shaped the international political science 
research agenda and it did so in three distinct areas – the study of party 
organisations, the consequences of electoral systems, and the concept of semi-
presidentialism. The paradox, though, and we may wish to call it Duverger’s 
Paradox, is that the ideas for which Duverger was internationally famous had 
very little impact on the research agenda within France. With the notable 
exception of Jean Blondel, who spent almost all of his working life outside 
France, there are very few other French political scientists who have studied 
political parties comparatively. The same is true for the study of electoral 
systems. Perhaps most tellingly of all, there are very few scholars within France 
who are willing even to entertain the concept of semi-presidentialism, 
particularly those whose training lies in constitutional and public law. 
 In both his academic work and his popular writings Duverger was often a 
controversial and contested figure. This was at least partly because he was 
always politically active. In 1936 he was a member of the extreme-right Parti 
populaire français (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2005, p. 305). In 1941 he published an 
article in the prestigious Revue du Droit Public that addressed the issue of the 
Vichy regime’s newly introduced rules concerning recruitment to the public 
service (Duverger, 1941). Duverger subsequently argued that this article merely 
described the anti-semitic rules that had been introduced by the regime. 
However, Duverger’s opponents, and they remain very vocal,ii argued that 
Duverger was providing a legal defence of the regime’s policies and, therefore, 
that he was a collaborator. Twice Duverger won a court case against magazines 
that portrayed this article as a collaborationist publication. After the war, 
Duverger became a regular contributor to the left-of-centre French newspaper of 
record, Le Monde, writing hundreds of articles over a 40-year period and 
commenting on all aspects of politics and policy. In the early 1960s he was a 
committed opponent of de Gaulle’s vision of the Fifth Republic. He became 
loosely associated with the socialists, and remained resolutely anti-communist in 
its pro-Soviet form (Duverger, 1980a). In 1989, he accepted an invitation to be 
included on the highly revisionist Italian Communist Party (PCI) list for the 
European Parliament (EP) and he was elected.iii He served for one term as a 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP). When the PCI was wound up he 
followed the majority of his MEP colleagues into the Social Democratic group in 
the EP. He was a member of the Committee on Institutional Affairs there and 
wrote at least two reports, one on transparency in EU documents and the other 
on relations between the EP and national parliaments. By the end of the 1990s he 
had left both academia and active politics. 
 There is no doubt that Duverger was a controversial figure. His wartime 
association with the extreme-right was probably a reason why he was never 
appointed to the Constitutional Council in France and it was certainly a reason 
why he failed to win election to the Académie française (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2005, 
p. 305). That said, he was a major figure in the development of the French 
political science community. In 1948, he was a driving force behind the creation 
of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, serving as the first director of the 
institution from 1948-55. He played a major role in the development of the 
Association française de science politique (AFSP) and was a member of the first 
Conseil d’administration of the AFSP in 1949. He helped to establish the 
International Political Science Association and was a member of its first 
Executive Committee also in 1949. In 1969, he was instrumental in the creation of 
the only stand-alone political science department in a French university, the 
Département de Science politique de la Sorbonne (now incorporated as l’UFR 11 
de Science politique). In 1971 he played an absolutely pivotal part in the creation 
of an agrégation for political science, the qualification required to become a 
university professor in France. This was a crucial development in the 
professionalisation of the discipline in France and he was the president of the 
first political science jury (Milet, 2001). 
In 1985 Duverger retired from the Sorbonne. By this time, he had already 
written an autobiography, although it contained precious few details about his 
controversial extreme-right past (Duverger, 1977). In 1987 he was the subject of a 
monumental festschrift (Colas and Emeri eds., 1987). Unusually, Duverger wrote 
the biographical sketch about himself in this book, including a defence of his 
1941 Revue du Droit Public article, even though this was scarcely necessary in 
such a celebratory volume. To this day, Duverger himself continues to be a 
subject of study. The ways in which his journalistic work complemented his 
academic career were explored by Dorandeu (1992). In 1998 his work was used 
to illustrate the teaching of political science within French Departments of Law 
(François, 1998). In 2003 Pascal Ory provided evidence that Duverger had 
written for the collaborationist magazine Progrès from late 1941 to early 1943 
under the pseudonym Philippe Orgène (Ory, 2003). In 2005 the journal French 
Politics published a symposium of various aspects of Duverger’s work, including 
a biographical essay (Hoffmann-Martinot, 2005).iv In 2009 at its biennial 
conference the Association française de science politique held a panel on 
Duverger’s contribution to political science. This was an interesting development 
and it is perhaps a sign that French political science is finally willing to confront 
and perhaps resolve Duverger’s Paradox. 
Over the course of his career, Duverger was an extremely prolific writer 
(Colas and Emeri eds., 1987, pp. 771-790). He was the author of more than 20 
books, many of which were regularly updated and published in revised editions. 
For example, his standard textbook Le systeme politique francais: Droit 
constitutionnel et Science politique was published in its 21st edition in 1996 
(Duverger, 1996). He was also the author of dozens of journal articles, most of 
which appeared in French journals including two landmark articles on French 
politics in the Revue française de Science politique (Duverger, 1959 and 1964). In 
addition, Duverger was also the author of dozens of book chapters, pamphlets 
and reports. The vast majority of Duverger’s work was published in French. 
However, he did publish in the American Political Science Review (Duverger, 1952) 
and in the European Journal of Political Research (Duverger, 1980b). He also 
contributed a small number of book chapters in English (e.g. Duverger, 1986). 
For the most part, though, Duverger’s work is best known in translation. His 
books have been translated into many different languages. For example, 
Hoffmann-Martinot (2005, p. 307) reports that his book Les régimes politiques was 
translated into eleven languages, including Japanese and Turkish. However, 
Duverger’s impact on the international political science research agenda results 
mainly from the English translation of his major book-length work, Les partis 
politiques, which was published in French in 1951 and which was translated into 
English as early as 1954. 
 In his work Duverger covered a huge variety of topics. In French, he 
wrote university textbooks on constitutional law, political institutions, political 
sociology, public finances, and political methodology. He also wrote books on 
international relations, as well as books that might be considered ‘light’ political 
theory dealing with topics such as democracy and dictatorship. He was an 
acknowledged expert on the study of French politics and, unlike his comparative 
work, his work on French party politics and the political institutions of both the 
Fourth and Fifth Republics had a great impact on the work of the French political 
science community from the 1950s through to the 1980s. More generally, 
Duverger was one of the first to write systematically about gender and politics, 
notably his UNESCO report on the political role of women (Duverger, 1955). 
That said, Duverger’s contribution to the international comparative politics 
research agenda rests primarily on his work on three topics – the development of 
party organisations, the effect of electoral systems on party systems, and the 
concept of semi-presidentialism. The rest of this chapter focuses on these three 
contributions, the enduring impact of which varies from one topic to another. 
 
PARTY ORGANISATIONS 
 
In his book Les partis politiques Duverger set out to provide nothing less than a 
“general theory of political parties” (Duverger, 1967, p. vii).v Indeed, he claimed 
to be providing the “first” such theory (ibid.). The book is organised in two parts. 
The first part deals with the organisation of parties, the second with the structure 
of the party system. In the first part of the book Duverger presents a distinction 
between different types of parties, notably between cadre and mass parties, and 
makes a general argument about the development of party organisations over 
time. This distinction and the argument about why there has been a shift from 
one type of party organisation to another is the source of Duverger’s first major 
contribution to the study of comparative politics. 
 In Les partis politiques, Duverger draws a number of distinctions between 
different types of parties. For example, he makes a distinction between parties 
whose origins lie within parliamentary politics and those whose origins are 
extra-parliamentary (ibid., pp. 2-16). He makes a further distinction between 
parties that have a direct structure – whereby there are members who join the 
party individually and pay a membership fee – and those that have an indirect 
structure – whereby the party is composed of unions, cooperatives, mutual 
societies and intellectual groups that come together to form an electoral 
organisation (ibid., pp. 22-34). Most notably, though, Duverger makes a 
distinction between cadre parties and mass parties (ibid., pp. 84-92). For 
Duverger, cadre parties are distinguished by the fact that they are top-down 
organisations. They are parties of notables who come together to stand at 
elections, to run the election campaign, and to finance the party’s operations 
(ibid., p. 85). By contrast, mass parties are more popular organisations, both in 
terms of party financing and in terms of participation in political life (ibid.). 
 By itself, the distinction between cadre and mass parties might have 
constitued merely one more dichotomous distinction among quite a number of 
others in the book. However, consistent with his aim of trying to provide a 
general theory of political parties, Duverger places the differences between the 
two types of parties in the context of a broader argument. This is the element of 
his argument that has shaped the research agenda over the years. Duverger 
argues that there was a general move from cadre parties to mass parties over 
time and that the move was caused by the shift from restricted suffrage to 
universal suffrage (ibid., p. 87). For Duverger, the parties of the left were the 
precursors of this move. They required a mass organisation in order to compete 
with the financial and political resources that were controlled by the (cadre) 
parties of the right that dominated during the period of restricted suffrage (ibid., 
pp. 89-92). While he did not say so explicitly in his discussion of cadre and mass 
parties, Duverger’s general theory of political parties suggested that the 
development of party organisation in this way was a natural phenomenon. For 
him, left-wing parties were “more developed” (ibid., p. 466) than their right-
wing counterparts and generally, for Duverger, the transformation of political 
parties in this way “constituted a development of democracy” (ibid., p. 467). 
 Over the years, Duverger’s argument about the development of party 
organisations has been contested. However, the fact that scholars have continued 
to take issue with it can be taken as a sign of strength rather than weakness. For 
example, Kirchheimer (1966) argued that West European party systems had 
witnessed the emergence of catch-all parties. Such parties were increasingly 
professional and leader-oriented. They were less concerned with ideology for its 
own sake and were more concerned with vote maximisation, communicating 
their messages via the mass media rather than through traditional party 
channels. The catch-all hypothesis is consistent with Duverger’s general 
argument about the apparently natural development of party organisations and  
Kirchheimer believes that parties have changed in response to the same electoral 
incentive that Duverger identified. Kirchheimer (1990, p. 56) states that 
“[c]onversion to catch-all parties constitutues a competitive phenomenon”. At 
the same time, Kirchheimer applies the argument to both bourgeois and socialist 
parties in Western Europe and he assumes that parties will compete for the 
median voter in the centre-ground (ibid., pp. 53-54). 
A similar contribution to this argument was made by Epstein (1980, 
original 1967). As noted above, Duverger implied that left-wing parties in the era 
of mass suffrage represented the natural model of party organisation and he 
drew on evidence from the development of European social democratic parties 
to make this point. By contrast, Epstein argued that American political parties, 
particularly the Republican party, provided the model for modern pary 
organisations. Consequently, as Ware (1996, p. 97) commented, “according to 
Epstein, it was not ‘contagion from the left’ but ‘contagion from the right’ ... that 
would characterize the future of party organizations in liberal democracies”. 
 In 1982, Panebianco (1988) provided an alternative approach to the study 
of party organisations. He argued that partiy organisations differ in terms of 
their genetic origins and their institutionalisation. In terms of their origins, 
Panebianco distinguishes between parties with territorial penetration – where the 
central party organisation “controls, stimulates, or directs” (ibid., p. 50) local 
organisations – and territorial diffusion – where “local elites contruct party 
associations which are only later integrated into a national organization” (ibid.). 
Panebianco also identifies ‘charismatic parties’, meaning parties that are 
associated with a particular founding leader. When drawing up this taxonomy, 
Panebianco explicitly separates his model from Duverger’s distinction between 
the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary origins of political parties (ibid.), 
providing the example of liberal parties whose origins were parliamentary and 
which developed through territorial diffusion, and conservative parties whose 
origins were also parliamentary but which developed through territorial 
penetration (ibid., p. 51). In terms of institutionalisation, Panebianco 
distinguishes between highly institutionalised parties that have considerable 
autonomy and independence from local party organisations and affiliated 
groups and weakly institutionalised parties that are reliant on their environment. 
Panebianco linked the genetic origins of parties and their institutionalisation, 
arguing that organisational change can occur over time but that it is based on a 
party’s initial genetic imprint and is constrained by the level of 
institutionalisation. Thus, for Panebianco, parties have different organisational 
characteristics from the ones identified by Duverger and respond to different 
incentives. 
 While Panebianco engaged with Duverger’s work, he provided an 
alternative to the Duvergerian explanation for the development of party 
organisation. By contrast, Katz and Mair’s (1995) notion of the ‘cartel party’ 
places itself explicitly in the Duvergerian tradition of party evolution and 
provides the most recent development in the study of party organisation. They 
outline two previous stages in the development of party organisation, namely 
the move from cadre parties to mass parties, and the move from mass parties to 
catch-all parties (ibid., pp. 8-12). Their innovation is to identify a third stage of 
party organisation development, the emergence of the cartel party, and to 
suggest that this model more neatly corresponds to contemporary party 
organisations (ibid., pp. 12-15). According to Katz and Mair, this development 
was caused by a number of factors (ibid.). The provision of welfare and 
education by the state meant that this function longer needed to be provided by 
parties and their social networks. Also, once in office, political parties found that 
they adapted to the practicalities of power, meaning that they often had to work 
in tandem with the state bureaucracy. Overall, whereas Duverger, Kirchheimer 
and Epstein viewed parties as essentially synonymous with civil society, the 
essence of Katz and Mair’s cartel party model is that parties have now become 
associated with the state: “On the one hand, parties aggregate and present 
demands from civil society to the state bureaucracy, while on the other they are 
the agents of that bureaucracy in defending policies to the public” (ibid., p. 13). 
 Together, these examples demonstrate Duverger’s impact on the study of 
party organisations. Duverger’s main contribution lies in his identification of 
different types of party organisation and in his key intuition that party 
organisations react to external incentives, specifically the changing nature of 
electoral competition. To put it another way, Duverger’s contribution lies in the 
fact that he was the first to consider party organisation to be a dependent 
variable – something that varies over time and place and the variation in which, 
therefore, needs to be explained by reference to certain factors. In this context, 
the debate as to whether parties have reacted to exactly the same incentive but 
not in exactly the same way that Duverger predicted (à la Kirchheimer, Epstein, 
and Katz and Mair) or whether they have reacted to different incentives and in 
different ways from the one that Duverger suggested (à la Panebianco) is less 
important than the very idea that they have reacted. By considering party 
organisations in this way, Duverger established a highly fruitful research agenda 
that was based on a cross-national comparative method rather than a historicist 
single-country study. 
 That said, these examples also indirectly illustrate the limits to Duverger’s 
impact on the study of political parties. In recent years, the study of political 
parties, particularly in the US, has focused primarily on parties as an explanatory 
variable. Specifically, the recent debate has been about party motivations – are 
parties office-seeking, vote-seeking, or policy-seeking? On the basis of these 
motivations, how do we explain the formation and termination of cabinets? (See, 
for example, Strøm and Müller eds., 1999). So, while Duverger was discussing 
very profound and important developments – the transformation of electoral 
politics and the organisation of political parties – and while Duverger’s work is 
central to those engaging in this debate, there is also a sense in which this is now 
a relatively specialised field of political inquiry. Indeed, in a recent review, 
Gianfranco Pasquino goes further, stating, regretfully, that “organisational 
analyses of contemporary parties have become quite rare, if not completely 
disappeared’ (Pasquino, 2008, p. 515). Overall, while Duverger’s name is still 
inextricably linked with the study of party organisations and while he has had a 
tremendous influence on the development of studies in this area, this topic is 
perhaps no longer the main focus of the international research agenda on 
political parties. 
 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
 
The difference between the study of party organisations and the study of 
electoral systems could not be greater. Benoit (2006, p. 70) notes that the study of 
the political consequences of electoral laws now constitutes “an entire subfield”. 
Moreover, Bowler (2008, p. 578) claims that the “electoral systems literature is 
one of the more advanced within political science …”. Riker (1982) used the 
study of electoral systems to illustrate that the study of politics could accumulate 
knowledge in a way that was characteristic of the study of science in general. 
More boldly still, Shugart (2005a, p. 27) asserts that the study of electoral systems 
has the potential to serve as the political science equivalent of the Rosetta Stone 
when it comes to unlocking the secrets of the systematic study of political life. In 
this context, Duverger’s work in Les partis politiques remains “the canonical 
statement …” (Bowler, 2008, p. 579), the “first truly seminal work” (Shugart, 
2005a, p. 28). As Shugart (ibid.) notes: “[p]robably the vast majority of works on 
electoral systems that have been published since [Les partis politiques] have 
continued in Duverger’s tradition …”. In other words, the study of electoral 
systems is central to the discipline of political science and Duverger’s 
contribution to the study of the consequences of electoral systems has helped to 
shape the development of the discipline over the last 50 and more years. 
 Duverger’s influence on the study of electoral systems stems from his 
formulation in Les partis politiques of what has come to be known universally as 
Duverger’s Law as well as what is now usually known as Duverger’s Hypothesis 
(Riker, 1982, p. 754). Duverger’s Law states: “the simple-majority single-ballot 
system favours the two-party system” (ibid., p. 247 – emphasis in the original). 
Duverger’s Hypothesis asserts: “the simple-majority system with second ballot and 
proportional representation favours a multi-party system” (ibid., p. 269 - emphasis in 
the original). The relationship between electoral systems and party systems was 
well known before Duverger’s formulation in Les partis politiques. Indeed, Riker 
(1982, p. 758) states that acceptance of both Duverger’s Law and Duverger’s 
Hypothesis was “quite general” by the early 1950s. The fact that these terms have 
stuck is due in part to Duverger’s temerity in claiming a law-like value for one of 
them. So, talking of the link between single-member plurality electoral systems 
and two-party systems, Duverger states famously: “Of all the hypotheses … in 
this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law” (ibid., 
p. 247). That said, Duverger’s contribution is based on more than just the 
chutzpah of a youthful academic. He provided a causal mechanism to explain 
the relationship between electoral systems and party systems and this element of 
his analysis was truly innovatory. He explains the relationship in terms of both a 
‘mechanical’ effect and a ‘psychological’ effect (Duverger, 1967, p. 256). While 
Duverger failed to define these concepts rigorously, he states that the mechanical 
effect refers simply to the ‘under-representation’ of third parties in a simple-
majority single-ballot system (ibid.), whereas the psychological effect relates to 
the voters’ anticipation of the mechanical effect (‘the fear of the wasted vote’ 
phenomenon). 
 There is now a voluminous amount of work in the Duvergerian tradition. 
Together, this has led Shugart (2005a, pp. 51-52) to state that “we have largely 
settled some of the core questions of the field – notably the relation between 
various electoral system variables and the number of parties and proportionality 
– and that these findings have been, to a significant degree, incorporated into 
mainstream political science”. For example, the standard test confirming 
Duverger’s mechanical effect was conducted by Rae (1971). He “showed 
definitively by an empirical comparison that plurality rules gave a greater 
relative advantage to large parties over small ones than did proportional 
representation rules” (Riker, 1982, p. 761). More recently, attention has shifted to 
the mechanical effect of district magnitude, which is often a proxy for electoral 
system type – majority systems having a lower district magnitude than 
proportional systems. So, Taagepera and Shugart (1993, p. 455) assert that if a 
single reason had to be given in answer to answer to the question ‘What 
determines the number of parties?’, then “it would have to be the district 
magnitude …” (emphasis in the original). Cox (1997) has extended the work on 
district magnitude to incorporate the M + 1 rule, namely that in an M-seat district 
there can be at most M + 1 viable candidates or lists. This work focuses on 
electoral coordination problems, both in terms of the problems faced by parties 
when deciding whether or not to stand candidates and the problems faced by 
voters when deciding whether or not to vote strategically. In this sense, Cox’s 
work emphasises the psychological rather than the mechanical effect of electoral 
systems. 
Generally, we now know that there is no deterministic link between 
electoral systems and party systems, even when it concerns single-member 
simple-majority systems (Benoit, 2006, p. 76). Then again, Duverger never 
posited such a relationship. He did state that there was a “nearly general 
association” (Duverger, 1967, p. 247) between first-past-the-post electoral 
systems and two-party systems, but he explicitly stated that socio-economic and 
ideological factors also help to shape party systems (ibid., p. 234). We also know 
that there is a stronger link between electoral systems and (dis)proportionality 
than between electoral systems and two-party or multi-party systems (Lijphart, 
1994). Finally, we suspect that Duverger may have got the relationship between 
electoral systems and party systems the wrong-way-round. For example, 
Colomer (2005) has argued that countries with multi-party systems choose 
proportional representation (PR) and that countries with a small number of 
parties tend to choose majority electoral systems. Overall, though, while the 
study of the consequences electoral systems has clearly moved on since 
Duverger’s work on this topic, Duverger’s intuitions remain broadly accurate 
and the impact of his proposed causal mechanism, particularly the mechanical 
effect, has been repeatedly demonstrated. 
In this context, it is perhaps remarkable that Duverger’s influence on the 
study of electoral systems stems from a single chapter in Les partis politiques 
(Duverger, 1967, pp. 236-312). Duverger never returned to this topic in a 
substantive way in any of his later work. Certainly, he repeated his claims in the 
various editions of his textbooks and he updated some of his examples, but he 
never devoted another chapter, journal article or book-length study to 
developing his ideas any further. In other words, the maturation of the subfield 
of electoral studies is entirely the result of people who have (presumably) read 
Duverger’s original statement and who have worked within the Duvergerian 
tradition, rather than the result of further work by Duverger himself and this is 
despite the fact that Duverger was academically active for more than 35 years 
after the original statement of the eponymous Law and Hypothesis. 
 In this context, Benoit (2006, pp. 71-72) identifies three reasons why 
Duverger’s work in Les partis politiques was so influential – as noted above, he 
was the first to claim a law-like status for the effect of electoral systems and he 
identified a causal mechanism to explain the law-like association; in addition, he 
provided more empirical evidence to back up his claims than previous writers. 
These reasons are undoubtedly correct, but Duverger’s long-term impact in this 
domain is also a function of two further factors. The first concerns the nature of 
the exercise in which he was engaged. Shugart (2005a, p. 27) argues that 
Duverger’s Law and electoral systems research in general “lends itself to 
quantification more readily than many of the other concerns in comparative 
politics because of the availability of ‘hard’ data, such as the number of votes and 
the number of seats”. In other words, Duverger’s work has been so influential 
because by outlining a clear causal mechanism and by identifying hypotheses 
that could be tested empirically on the basis of ‘hard’ data he was engaging in a 
method of analysis that was consistent with the subsequent development of the 
discipline of political science as a whole, particularly in the US. For example, 
Joseph and Mildred Schlesinger (2006, p. 59) argue that Duverger’s work on 
electoral systems has fared well because it “fits neatly into the rational-choice 
model”. In other words, the micro-foundations of Duverger’s Law and 
Duverger’s Hypothesis are consistent with a preference-based individualistic 
analysis. Given the dominance of this type of analysis in the development of 
comparative politics research agenda particularly over the last 25 years, 
Duverger’s work on electoral systems naturally finds its way into the canon of 
texts in this domain. Indeed, this point also helps to account for this element of 
Duverger’s Paradox. Rational choice has not been prevalent within France and 
large-n comparative studies using statistical methods have not been standard. 
Therefore, while the research agenda set by Duverger meshed very well with the 
development of political science as a discipline primarily in the US, it is 
unsurprising that researchers within France have generally been less inclined to 
follow his lead and develop the study of electoral systems in the same way. 
 The second reason why Duverger’s work on electoral systems has been so 
influential is because it is so transferable. That is to say, electoral systems can be 
operationalised as a variable in studies completely unrelated to party systems, 
proportionality etc., but still on the basis of the logic inherent in Duverger’s 
original analysis. For example, Stephanie Rickard (2009) has shown that electoral 
rules determine the benefits politicians gain from providing transfers to either 
broad or narrow groups. She hypothesises that politicians under PR systems are 
more likely to supply transfers to narrow interests. This is partly because PR is 
associated with multi-party governments. Here, “although the costs of providing 
many narrow transfers may be detrimental to the country as a whole, each party 
in a coalition government can shirk responsibility for these costs” (ibid., p. 9). 
The transferability of specific research on electoral systems to more general 
questions on completely unrelated topics is another difference between this 
aspect of Duverger’s work and his work on party organisations. There is little 
scope to operationalise variation in party organisation as an explanatory 
variable. Indeed, to the extent that Duverger and many of his successors 
proposed a teleological-like conception of the development of party organisation 
whereby particular forms of party organisation have been dominant at particular 
times, then at any one time there is often little variation to operationalise. 
In sum, Duverger’s work on electoral systems has been influential not just 
in terms of the substantive way in which he set the agenda for the study of the 
consequences of electoral systems, but also because the logic underpinning this 
work can serve as the bedrock of studies in many other aspects of comparative 
politics too. 
 
SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM 
 
The term ‘semi-presidential’ predates Duverger’s work on the topic.vi However, 
he was the first to identify systematically the concept of semi-presidentialism in 
the 11th edition of his textbook Institutions politiques et Droit constitutionnel in 1970 
(Duverger, 1970). Over the course of the next few editions of this book, he refined 
the concept identifying a slightly different set of semi-presidential countries each 
time.vii The mature expression of the concept came with his book Echec au roi 
(Duverger, 1978), which has never been translated into English. He returned to 
the topic in a number of French-language books during the 1980s, including the 
first ever edited volume on the topic (Duverger ed., 1986). While his French-
language work on this topic remains very rewarding and is by far the most 
comprehensive expression of his ideas, Duverger’s influence on the study of 
semi-presidentialism stems largely from a single English-language article in the 
European Journal of Political Research (Duverger, 1980). He did return, tangentially, 
to this theme in English when his 1980 article was chosen as one of the most 
influential articles in the first 25 years of the journal (Duverger, 1997), but, as 
with his work on party organisations and electoral systems, Duverger’s influence 
on the study of semi-presidentialism is derived for the most part from a very 
small amount of English-language work. 
 The truly innovative element of Duverger’s work on semi-presidentialism 
is the identification of the concept itself. Prior to his analysis, attention had 
focused solely on the concepts of presidentialism and parliamentarism. Duverger 
identified a new type of constitutional arrangement, semi-presidentialism, with 
the following characteristics: “[A] political regime is considered as semi-
presidential if the constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) 
the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he [sic] possesses 
quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister 
and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in 
office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (Duverger, 
1980, p. 166). Duverger’s formulation of semi-presidentialism was undoubtedly 
inspired by the constitutional situation in France and, in particular, by the 
situation after the 1962 constitutional reform there. That said, while much of his 
empirical analysis also focuses on France – indeed, almost half of Echec au roi 
considers the French case – Duverger always places semi-presidentialism in a 
comparative context, comparing France with five contemporary cases of semi-
presidentialism in Western Europe and the case of Weimar Germany. 
In his work on semi-presidentialism, Duverger’s sole aim is to explain 
why presidential power varies both across time within individual countries and 
across countries generally. He states: “the purpose of the concept of semi-
presidential government is to explain why relatively homogeneous constitutions 
are applied in radically different ways” (ibid., p. 177). To this end, he proposes 
four factors: “the actual content of the constitution, the combination of tradition 
and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority, and the 
position of the president in relation to this majority” (ibid.). In other words, and 
while Duverger did not use these terms, the definition of semi-presidentialism 
acts as his case-selection mechanism, presidential power is his dependent 
variable, and he interacts four independent variables to explain the variations in 
presidential power within and across the cases in his set. 
 In contrast to Duverger’s work on party organisations and electoral 
systems, his work on semi-presidentialism was not immediately influential. 
Instead, semi-presidentialism came to shape the international comparative 
politics research agenda only after 1990 when the collapse of communism 
resulted in the creation of many new semi-presidential countries. At this time, a 
debate took place about the relative merits of presidentialism vs parliamentarism 
(Linz 1990a, 1990b). At first, semi-presidentialism was only a relatively minor 
element of that debate. For example, Linz (1994) only addressed semi-
presidentialism as an aside within his standard essay on presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. Moreover, the focus of this debate was very different from the 
one with which Duverger himself was concerned in his work. This debate 
operationalised semi-presidentialism as an explanatory variable, while the 
dependent variable was invariably the success or failure of democracy. 
From very early on in this debate, semi-presidentialism was generally 
viewed as a problematic constitutional choice for unconsolidated democracies. 
For example, Linz states: “In view of some of the experiences with this type of 
system it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself [semi-presidentialism] can 
generate democratic stability” (ibid, p. 55). Similarly, Lijphart (2004, p. 102) 
states: “Semi-presidential systems represent only a slight improvement over pure 
presidentialism … [P]arliamentary government should be the general guideline 
for constitution writers in divided societies”. By contrast, Sartori (1997) believes 
that semi-presidentialism, while not perfect, does have some advantages over 
alternative constitutional arrangements. In the sole statement that he made on 
the subject, Duverger (1997, p. 137) supported the adoption of semi-
presidentialism by young democracies, asserting that semi-presidentialism has 
“become the most effective means of transition from dictatorship towards 
democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union”. 
 In the years since Duverger’s work on the topic, the study of semi-
presidentialism has developed in two main ways. The first development 
concerns the definition of semi-presidentialism. The problem with Duverger’s 
definition lies with the criterion that a president must possess “quite 
considerable” powers in order for a country to be called semi-presidential (Elgie, 
1999). Duverger’s own work created some confusion in this regard because he 
regularly included Ireland and Iceland in his list of semi-presidential countries, 
even though both have purely figurehead presidents. More generally, even if 
most writers excluded Ireland and Iceland from their list of semi-presidential 
countries, the concept of ‘quite considerable’ presidential powers was still 
sufficiently ambiguous for different writers to identify different sets of semi-
presidential countries. This meant that writers often failed to compare like with 
like when examining the performance of semi-presidentialism. Moreover, it led 
to a problem of case selection bias. In their list of semi-presidential regimes, 
writers often assumed a behavioural definition of semi-presidentialism and 
included only those countries where, in practice, the president and the prime 
minister both have some powers. They observed that these countries often 
suffered from presidential/prime ministerial conflict and they concluded that 
semi-presidential countries in general suffer from problems of executive 
coordination. Obviously, though, they reached this conclusion because the 
countries they chose to define as semi-presidential were ones most likely to 
suffer from problems of executive coordination in the first place. The solution to 
both of these problems has been to reformulate Duverger’s definition. Semi-
presidentialism is now usually defined as the situation where a constitution 
establishes both a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet 
that are collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie, 2005, Shugart 2005b, 
Skach 2005). 
 The second development follows on from the first. When Duverger’s 
definition is reformulated, then around one-third of all countries in the world 
now have a semi-presidential constitution, including France, Ireland, Russia, and 
Timor Leste. However, as these examples suggest, there is great institutional and 
political variation within the set of semi-presidential countries. This variation 
makes it impossible to use semi-presidentialism as an explanatory variable in, for 
example, studies that compare its impact on democratic survival relative to that 
of presidential and parliamentary regimes. The solution is to identify different 
types of semi-presidentialism and to compare the effects of each type. Shugart 
and Carey (1992) were the first to adopt this strategy when they distinguished 
between president-parliamentarism – semi-presidential countries where the 
prime minister is responsible both the president and the legislature – and 
premier-presidentialism – where the prime minister is responsible only to the 
legislature. There is strong evidence to suggest that the president-parliamentary 
form of semi-presidentialism is much more damaging to democracy than its 
premier-presidential counterpart (ibid.). 
 The concept of semi-presidentialism remains contested. There are still 
political scientists who refuse to operationalise the concept of semi-
presidentialism and who prefer the somewhat differently formulated concept of 
‘mixed’ regimes (Cheibub, 2007). The concept of semi-presidentialism also has 
very little support within the sub-discipline of constitutional law. For example, a 
recent suite of articles in the European Constitutional Law Review explicitly 
preferred the term “presidential elements in government” to that of semi-
presidentialism (Reestman, 2006). Indeed, in France this element of Duverger’s 
Paradox is very strong. There has been opposition to the concept of semi-
presidentialism from students of public law from the time when Duverger first 
identified it in 1970.viii Here, the presidential/parliamentary dichotomy remains 
firmly entrenched. Finally, even among those political scientists who fully accept 
the concept of semi-presidentialism and who work resolutely within the 
Duvergerian tradition, fundamental problems with Duverger’s work on the topic 
are still acknowledged (Elgie, 2009, p. 261). 
 Overall, Duverger’s impact on the study of semi-presidentialism lies 
somehow midway between his impact on the study of party organisations and 
his study of the consequences of electoral systems. In contrast to the study of 
party organisations, there is a thriving debate about the impact of semi-
presidentialism on political outcomes, particularly democratic survival. In this 
sense, Duverger’s work is still shaping the international comparative political 
research agenda. However, in contrast to his work on electoral systems, where 
his identification of the mechanical and psychological effect remains the 
underlying causal explanation for the impact of different electoral systems, 
Duverger’s work on semi-presidentialism remains noteworthy more for his 
identification of the concept in the first place rather than for his attempts to 
explain why presidential power varies across the set of semi-presidential 
countries. In summary, of Duverger’s three key contributions to political science, 
semi-presidentialism is the area where those working within the Duvergerian 
tradition have moved furthest away from Duverger’s own ideas on the subject. 
This is not to diminish his contribution in this domain, merely to place it in its 
appropriate academic context. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Maurice Duverger was one of the most important contributors to the study of 
French political life from the 1950s to the 1980s. More generally, he is known as 
the writer who distinguished between cadre and mass parties, who formalised 
Duverger’s Law, and who identified a new type of political system – semi-
presidentialism – when only a handful of examples of such a system were in 
existence. The success of Les partis politiques was so immediate because he was 
the first to express certain ideas, because he expressed them in a way that was 
both rigorous and startling, and because he martialled copious amounts of 
empirical evidence to back up his arguments. While Duverger’s short-term 
reputation may have been assured by such an exercise, his enduring legacy lies 
in the fact that he approached the study of politics – at least in much of Les partis 
politiques and later in the study of semi-presidentialism – in a way that was 
consistent with the general development of political science as a discipline. 
Duverger emphasised the explanatory importance of political institutions. 
Moreover, he did so three decades before the ‘institutional turn’ in political 
science in the mid-1980s. As his work on semi-presidentialism clearly shows, he 
understood the need to interact variables in order to explain political outcomes. 
This method is at the core of the contemporary international comparative politics 
research agenda. Certainly, comparativists have taken the study of political 
parties, electoral systems and semi-presidentialism both much further and in 
different directions from the ways in which they were studied by Duverger, but 
at bottom contemporary political scientists are engaged in exactly the same sort 
of exercise that he was engaged in. The fact that Duverger engaged in such an 
exercise at a time when the study of political science was in its infancy and in a 
country where the normative study of institutions was, and remains, dominant is 
testimony to Duverger’s unique contribution to the development of comparative 
politics. 
Notes
                                                
i I would like to acknowledge the generous help of the Irish Research Council for 
the Humanities and Social Sciences for their award of a Senior Research 
Fellowship in 2009-2010, during which time this chapter was completed. 
ii See the report in Nicolas César, ‘A Bordeaux, l’exposition Chaval soulève la 
polémique’, in La Croix, 6 June 2008, http://www.la-
croix.com/article/index.jsp?docId=2339707&rubId=5548, accessed 5 June 2009. 
iii See the article by Duverger in Le Monde, ‘Les élections européennes. Pourquoi je 
suis candidat sur la liste du PCI’, 7 May, 1989. 
iv The symposium was published in French Politics vol. 3, no. 3, 2005, and vol. 4, 
no. 1, 2006. 
v Quotations are taken from the 1967 edition to take account of the slight 
amendment that Duverger made to his original 1951 text. All translations from 
this edition are by the author. 
vi See the series of posts under the heading ‘Is this the first reference to semi-
presidentialism?’ at www.semipresidentialism.com. 
vii For a review, see Elgie (1999). 
viii See, for example, Phlippe Lauvaux’ review of the 18th ed. of Duverger’s textbook 
Le système politique français. Droit constitutionnel et systèmes politiques, in Revue 
internationale de droit comparé, 1987, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 284-286. 
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